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latter rule and in conflict with the weight of authority, are distinguishable on the ground that something more than the payment of the purchase price on the part of the vendor was necessary to effect a transfer of title. *Swallow v. Emery*, 111 Mass. 355; *Arthur v. Blackburn*, 63 Fed. 536.

**WATERS AND WATER COURSES—RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS.**—The plaintiffs were the owners of a dairy farm, through which flowed a natural stream of water well suited to the plaintiff's purposes. The defendants were riparian owners and operated a coal mine up the stream. In washing coal much fine material was carried into the creek, rendering the water unfit for domestic purposes and especially for watering stock. The plaintiffs claim damages for the pollution of the water. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the water flow in the stream without material pollution. *Packwood v. Mendota Coal & Coke Co.*, (Wash. 1915) 146 Pac. 163.

The court says "that the right to the reasonable use of the water by a riparian owner for manufacturing or industrial purposes, resulting in the pollution of the water with foreign substances, is limited to the extent that such use must not materially pollute the water to the substantial damage of the lower riparian owner." It was pointed out that a reasonable user depends upon the detriment caused to the lower riparian owner and is a question of fact to be determined in each case. *Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Hamilton*, 100 Ala. 252. The court in the principal case points out that "this might not be the limit of the company's right to the use of the water as a riparian owner, were it putting the water to ordinary and domestic uses," and cited *McEvoy v. Taylor*, 56 Wash. 357. Cases adjudicated since *McEvoy v. Taylor* draw the same distinction. *Halfrich v. Clonville Water Co.*, 74 Md. 269; see 26 L. R. A. N. S. 222 and note. These cases clearly show that what may be a reasonable use for domestic purposes may not be considered a reasonable use for industrial purposes. The principal case follows the weight of authority. *Snow v. Parsons*, 28 Vt. 499; *Baltimore v. Warren*, 59 Md. 96; *Young v. Bankier Distilling Co.*, [1893] A. C. 691; *Merrifield v. Lanbard*, 13 Allen 16; GOULD, WATERS, § 220; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 658. The principal case is distinguished from *Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson*, 113 Pa. 126, in an interesting manner. In the latter case the stream formed the natural drainage of the basin in which the coal was situated and the stream was polluted by the flow of water by gravity alone, from a coal company's mine.

**WILLS—BEQUESTS FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES.**—A bequest to a church of \$1,000 "to be used for paying the church debt" *held* not adeemed by the church debt having been paid before the death of the testator. *Greeley v. First Universalist Society of Nashua*, (N. H. 1915) 92 Atl. 958.

This is probably the first case where the question of ademption has been raised in which the special purpose was accomplished by another than the testator. A bequest for a special purpose is adeemed by the accomplishment of the purpose, by the testator in his lifetime. *Debeze v. Mann*, 2 Bro. C. C. 165, 29 Eng. Rep. 94; *In re Corbett*, [1903] 2 Ch. 326; *Hine v. Hine*, 39 Barb. 507; *Tanton v. Keller*, 167 Ill. 129, 47 N. E. 376; *Taylor v. Tolen*, 38